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Introduction: One of the six “values-related
infringement proceedings” pending at the time
of the activation of Article 7(1) TEU in respect of
Hungary
On 18 June 2020, in the case of Commission v Hungary (Transparency of
associations), the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held that Hungarian
authorities “introduced discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on foreign donations
to civil society organisations” when it adopted a new legislation in 2017 “on the
Transparency of Organisations which receive Support from Abroad” (Lex NGO
hereinafter). In doing so, Hungarian authorities have violated Article 63 TFEU (free
movement of capital) as well as Articles 7 (right to respect for private and family life),
8 (right to the protection of personal data) and 12 (right to freedom of association) of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The European Commission’s infringement action, launched in July 2017, is one
of the six “values-related infringement proceedings” in relation to Hungary, as the
European Commission highlighted in November 2018 when the Council asked it to
report on the situation in the country following the activation of Article 7(1) TEU by
the European Parliament in September 2018. The other five infringement actions
mentioned concern the targeting of the Central European University (Case C-66/18:
judgment pending); the violation of Hungary’s legal obligation on the relocation
of applicants for international protection (Case C-718/17: judgment issued on 2
April 2020 found Hungary to have failed to fulfil it EU obligations); the adoption
of measures violating EU asylum law (Case C-808/18: judgment pending); the
criminalisation of activities in support of asylum and residence applications (Case
C-821/19: judgment pending); and the discrimination of Roma children in the field of
education (action launched in May 2016, but the case is yet to reach the CJ). 
The contested measure (Act LXXVI of 2017 on the transparency of foreign funded
organisations adopted on 13 June 2017) was ostensibly promulgated to ensure
greater transparency of civil society organisations in receipt of “foreign funds”
or donations from persons or organisations outside of Hungary. The law obliges
detailed annual reporting on accounts by NGOs to a competent court of data relating
to their identity, to the financial support reaching or exceeding certain amounts
which they receive from natural or legal persons having their place of residence or
registered office in another Member State or in a third country and to the identity of
such persons. Information on “foreign funded” NGOs would then be published on
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a public website, while NGOs were also obliged to indicate on documentation and
publicity that they were an “organisation in receipt of support from abroad”. 
Underlying this ostensible push for transparency is an essential distrust in the
motivations of civil society organisations. More importantly, it creates the semblance
in the eyes of Hungarians of foreign support being something which is intrinsically
suspicious, possibly illegal, but certainly undermining national interests. 
The Judgment in Case C-78/18
On the first point of admissibility, the judgment followed the Opinion of the Advocate
General (for analysis of the Opinion see here), and rejected these all claims by
the Hungarian government saying that too little time was given to respond to the
Commission’s allegations. Importantly, the CJ held that the Commission had
not made it more difficult for it to refute its complaints, and accepted that the
Commission had, at all relevant stages, duly taken account of the comments made
by Hungary in response to the reasoned opinion. 
When entering the merits, echoing recent decisions on matters related to judicial
independence, the Court repeatedly and rightly took a holistic approach by looking
at the “content and combined effects” of the various measures in dispute (see
also “seen as whole” and “viewed together”). The Court found that the impugned
legislation had treated capital movements in an indirectly discriminatory manner by
distinguishing as between capital from Hungary on the one hand and movement
from other EU Member States and third countries on the other. It could find no
justification in such differentiation of competence to monitor financial support from
Hungarian nationals in Hungary and those from and established abroad as they
apply differences in treatment which do not correspond with objective differences in
situations. 
Moreover, Hungarian authorities had done so in an exclusive and “targeted manner”
such as to “stigmatis[e] those associations and foundations, those provisions are
such as to create a climate of distrust with regard to them, apt to deter natural or
legal persons from other Member States or third countries from providing them
with financial support.” At multiple junctures in the judgment, the Court highlighted
this instigation of a “climate of distrust’ (para 58) and “generalised climate of
mistrust” (para 118) and the “dissuasive” (para 116) or “deterrent effect” (para
44 and para 118) of the obligations imposed on exclusively “foreign” (or simply
non-Hungarian) financial support to NGOs based in the country. This finding is
critical to wider arguments and concerns relating to the health of the civic space in
Hungary: the impugned measures are not singular examples of bad law, but rather
representative of a broader pattern which has seen “legalistic autocrats” deliberately
use legal regulation targeted at reducing or removing any degree of dissent or
disagreement in the public and political space.
The Court dismissed the Hungarian government’s argument which sought to justify
the measure based on the exceptions within Article 63 TFEU or by an overriding
reason in the public interest, highlighting that the state objective of transparency of
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donations “although legitimate, cannot justify legislation of a Member State which
is based on a presumption made on principle and applied indiscriminately (our
emphasis) that any financial support paid by a natural or legal person established
in another Member State or in a third country and any civil society organisation
receiving such financial support are intrinsically liable to jeopardise the political
and economic interests of the … Member State and the ability of its institutions to
operate free from interference.” (One may add that a country whose institutions are
able to operate free from any “interference” from groups of citizens would not be a
democracy tout court.) 
The Court found that even were the argument to be in pursuit of a legitimate aim, no
proportionality of the measure could be established as the law seems to be based
“not on the existence of a genuine threat but on a presumption made on principle
and indiscriminately that financial support that is sent from other Member States or
third countries and the civil society organisations receiving such financial support are
liable to lead to such a threat.” (para 93)
Simply, the law does not “set out why that objective allegedly justifies the obligations
at issue applying indiscriminately to all the organisations which fall within the scope
of that law, instead of targeting those which, having regard to their aims and the
means at their disposal, are genuinely likely to have a significant influence on
public life and public debate.” (para 79) While the Court, correctly in our view, found
the targeting of foreign source of funding for NGOs to be unjustifiable, its focus
on the indiscriminate nature of the law (as between ‘foreign’ funded NGOs) has
opened up a potential weakness in reasoning and future application. Where the
issue is the indiscriminate nature of the application of the law, a potential point of
exploitation would be a targeted use of law on civil society organisations “likely to
have a significant influence on public life and public debate” – and critically those
willing to challenge the weakening constraints on executive power and rule of law
backsliding. 
On questions related to the infringement of fundamental rights enshrined in the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court held that Hungary had also failed to fulfil
its obligations under Article 7, Article 8 and Article 12 of the Charter. The dissuasive/
deterrent effect of the “systematic obligations” imposed on the associations and
foundations falling within the scope of the Lex NGO are such that this legislation
must be found as violating the right to freedom of association, the right to respect for
private and family life as well as the right to the protection of personal data. 
With respect to the Hungarian government’s claim that the public has a right to
be informed, the Court of Justice, possibly for the first time, dealt with the concept
of public figure one may found in the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights. In line with this case law, the Court of Justice held that donating to NGOs
above the thresholds laid down in the Lex NGO does not obviously mean donors are
public figures who cannot claim the same protection of their private life as private
persons. And “even if, given their specific aims, some of those organisations and
those persons must be regarded as participating in public life in Hungary, the fact
remains that granting such financial support does not entail the exercise of a political
role.” (para 131)
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The Court concluded that the Lex NGO “cannot be justified by any of the objectives
of general interest recognised by the Union which Hungary relied upon”. (para 140)
This meant that there was not even a need to consider whether Lex NGO met the
requirement of proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter.  
Possible reactions to the judgment
According to EU law, the Hungarian government must now bring its legislation in line
with the multiple provisions of EU law it has been violating since 2017. Should it fail
to do so, the Commission may start yet another procedure and request the Court to
impose financial penalties. 
Early public statements by Fidesz politicians are not promising. Justice Minister
Judit Varga claimed that the judgment is in fact a victory for her government as
it allegedly confirmed that the government’s “goal of increasing the transparency
of NGO finances” was legitimate. She – and several captured Hungarian media
outlets – failed to mention the remaining 95% of the judgment and the ratio decidendi
holding that Lex NGO had “introduced discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on
foreign donations to civil society organisations, in breach of its obligations under
Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union”. Never one to shy away from promoting tin foil hat conspiracies
combined with “the use of anti-Semitic tropes”, Orbán has now suggested that the
Court of Justice’s ruling is due to the hidden liberal and imperialist forces of the
Soros-network. This strategy aims to pre-empting any meaningful debate while also
preparing the ground for non-compliance or most likely, a façade of compliance with
the judgment. 
In this respect, six potential scenarios can be outlined from not doing anything
(scenario 1) – an unlikely option due to the threat of pecuniary sanctions – to full
and good faith compliance with the judgment resulting in the total repeal of the Lex
NGO (scenario 6) – equally unlikely. Between these two most unlikely scenarios,
four additional ones may be foreseen:
(scenario 2) The unicameral Hungarian Parliament, where Orbán has a
supermajority, may adopt some slight amendments which will not however make any
difference as regards for instance the dissuasive/deterrent effect of the current legal
framework.
(scenario 3) To save face and not be seen as backtracking under the pressure of
the “Western-European headquarters of liberal imperialism”, as Orbán put it, the
Hungarian government could instruct the captured Hungarian Constitutional Court
(HCC hereinafter) to issue a judgment which would give them the cover to do so.
That way, Orbán could still pose as a freedom fighter conducting a war against
foreign interests while at the same time pretend to be one concerned with the rule
of law. Indeed, the HCC has now been sitting on the Lex NGO waiting to be told
what to do as soon as the Court of Justice’s ruling would come it. All of this of
course under the pretext of “constitutional dialogue”. As one of us argued earlier,
“whereas this justification may sound as persuasive and Europe-friendly, in reality it
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is a fake argument, an abuse of a legal concept, so as … to grant more time to the
government to harass and intimidate NGOs”. Depending on the instructions from
Orbán, the HCC may either quash the Lex NGO, partially find it unconstitutional, or,
on the contrary, find the Court of Justice’s judgment ultra vires… which is our next
scenario. 
(scenario 4) One cannot exclude that the HCC ends up clearing the Lex NGO
completely while finding the Court of Justice’s judgment to be objectively arbitrary.
The recent judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court ruling on the
European Central Bank’s Public Sector Purchase Program could be used as the fig-
leaf to cover this additional violation of the EU Treaties. 
(scenario 5) A combination of the above scenarios is also plausible: the lawmaker
may amend Lex NGO and introduce some cosmetic changes that do not change
the detrimental effects of the law in essence, and the case would then be taken up
again by the HCC. This is exactly what happened with the case of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. After a condemning European Court of Human
Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) judgment in Magyar v. Hungary, the lawmaker introduced
a new system of revisiting real life imprisonments that again failed to comply with
the Strasbourg test. When the HCC decided to take the case that had been pending
before it for years, it rejected in Resolution 3013/2015. (I. 27.) the need to examine
the case on the merits on the ground of the Rules of the HCC, according to which
a case becomes substantially obsolete if the circumstances giving rise to the
complaint ceased to exist in the meanwhile. This case-law may well be invoked
when assessing a modified Lex NGO. But of course the fact that a law is amended
does not make it automatically constitution- or ECHR-conform  – and indeed in a
later Strasbourg procedure, T. P and A. T. v. Hungary the new life imprisonment
rules were also held to be contrary to the ECtHR.
Concluding remarks
From among the above-mentioned possibilities, if any of the scenarios 1, 2, 4
and 5 were followed, the violation of EU law would continue to exist. It is to be
hoped therefore that the Commission will not let itself fooled again (deliberately
or otherwise), and stand ready to promptly return to the ECJ to sanction non-
compliance. Indeed, and as promised and reiterated many times by Ursula von der
Leyen, when it comes to the rule of law, there cannot be any compromise.
Thus far the Commission ought to have done better and ought to have done much
more. By better we mean systematically applying for interim measures which the
Commission has failed to do in this instance and also in the case of the forced
expulsion of the Central European University in Budapest. The result: irreparable
damage has been done during a period of three years during which Orbán has been
able to subject NGOs it does not like to arbitrary, disproportionate and unlawful
requirements. By more we mean systematically launching infringement actions
rather than expressing ‘concerns’ every time a new deliberate breach of EU law and
in particular its foundational values is committed. 
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The Commission has failed to do so with altogether six “Article 2 TEU values-
related infringement proceedings in relation to Hungary” referred to the Court of
Justice since the 2013 Tavares report, that is, less than one Article 2 TEU related
infringement action per year on average since 2013 with not a single one launched
by the VDL Commission to date.
The result of this passivity: “The EU has its first non-democracy as a member:
Hungary is now classified as an electoral authoritarian regime.” 
In addition Poland, another member country abandoning the path of the rule of law,
copies the Hungarian tactics silencing those who speak truth to power. The Polish
government is now preparing an attack on NGOs along similar lines to Lex NGO.
The Commission is not the only institution to have failed Hungarians. Too many
European actors are strong on rhetoric and short on action. 
National governments were happy to hide behind the Commission rather than
launching their own infringement actions. They were not even bothered to support
the Commission before the Court of Justice in the present case, except for Sweden. 
The EPP has a lot to answer for in this respect for not enforcing its multiple “red
lines”, one of which demanded in April 2017 that Orbán respect NGOs. 
Whatever the outcome of the Lex NGO case, one can expect the Fidesz government
to use the transparency card again “as a pretext to control NGOs or to restrict their
ability to carry out their legitimate work”. As noted by the Venice Commission in
2017, “this effect would go beyond the legitimate aim of transparency which is
alleged to be the only aim” of the Lex NGO. But this won’t matter much to Orbán. By
the time the Commission returns to the Court, more irreparable damage would have
been done and Hungary’s transformation into a fully-fledged authoritarian regime
further consolidated on the back of generous EU funds. 
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